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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
DEREK CHAD CHISM, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030412-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS GIVEN THAT THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC 
ARTICULABLE FACTS THAT CHSIM WAS ENGAGED IN ANY 
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 
The State properly cites that "once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" (Br 
of App. at 6, quoting State v. Despain, 2003 UT App 266, \ 7, 74 P.3d 1176). The State 
further quotes: "If the officer reasonably suspects more serious criminal activity, 'the 
scope of the stop is still limited.' The officer must 'diligently pursue[] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel [his or her] suspicions quickly, during 
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant'" (Br. of App. at 7-8; citing State v. 
Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,110, 994 P.2d 1278 (citations omitted)). However, the State 
incorrectly asserts that an officer's mere hunch or "sense," without more, that a driver's 
i 
license might be fake is sufficient cause to exceed the scope of the original traffic stop 
and further detain a passenger in order to run a warrants check on the passenger and 
check the validity of that passenger's driver's license. Chism asserts that a mere hunch or 
"sense" is insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion, and that based on the 
totality of the circumstances, there were insufficient specific, articulable facts to support 
running a warrants check and an identification check. 
The State attempts to analogize the facts of State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994) and Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), to this case in an effort to 
conclude that running a warrants check and identification check on a driver of an 
automobile would allow the officer in this case to run a warrants check on Chism. This 
analogy fails, however, because Chism was not the driver of the automobile, but was only 
a passenger. In fact, the Court in Lopez made clear that "asking for the passenger's name 
and date of birth to running a warrants check on her severed the chain of rational 
inference from specific articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as 
yet 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Id. at 1133 (citations omitted). 
The State also claims that the facts in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), 
are distinguishable because the officer in Johnson was "proceeding from a lack of facts 
rather than observation of specific facts," whereas in this case "the trial court recited 
those facts available to Deputy Randall" (Br. of App. at 10). The State's claims fails 
because the trial court's recitation of the facts available to Deputy Randall are mostly 
irrelevant to the issue of whether specific articulable facts supported a finding of 
reasonable suspicion that Chism was engaged in more serious criminal activity. The fact 
that Chism had the odor of tobacco, had a discolored tongue, and that there was tobacco 
on the dashboard are not facts akin with the necessary articulated facts that would support 
reasonable suspicion that Chism was engaged in a more serious crime (R. 43-44). Chism 
readily admitted that he was smoking (R. 100: 7). 
The only relevant fact cited by the trial court was Randall's "sense" that Chism 
was underage. Randall's inchoate and unparticularized hunch was supported only by his 
subjective observation that Chism looked younger than 19. Not only was this hunch 
incorrect, since Chism was 19, but even Randall admitted that the license was not 
tampered with (R. 100: 14). Instead of diligently pursuing a means of investigation that 
was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions or hunch quickly, such as further 
questioning Chism and the other occupants about Chism's age, Randall instead took 
Chism's license and ran a warrants check and identification check - vastly increasing the 
length of detention and exceeding the scope of the original stop. 
Chism asserts that Randall's actions are akin to the officer's action in Johnson. In 
Johnson, where the officer discovered that neither the driver nor passenger owned the 
vehicle and they could not produce proof of registration, the Court observed that this 
information only "raised the possibility that the car had been stolen." 805 P.2d at 762. 
While the Court recognized that these facts "are just as consistent with the more likely 
scenario that the driver borrowed the car from its rightful owner," it held that these facts 
do "no t rise to the level of an articulable suspicion that the car was stolen." Id. at 764. 
This situation is highly similar to the facts in this case. Although Randall 
perceived that Chism might be underage, the fact that the license was not tampered with 
and that Chism's appearance was a close match to the picture are just as consistent with 
the more likely scenario that Chism's license in fact was valid. Thus, the State's 
assertions that Johnson is not relevant to this case are incorrect. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Chism asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of June, 2004. 
Margaret Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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